Trust
Verify your download.
Anyone can publish a file. These are the commands that prove the one you downloaded is the one we built.
Why a checksum alone is not enough
A SHA-256 proves a file arrived intact. It does not prove who made it: whoever could replace an installer could replace the checksum list in the same action, and both would still match. So we sign the checksum list itself, and publish the key here rather than next to it.
Why the key is on this page
If verification fails
An opinion that is not ours
The Sparcle release signing key
Ed25519, via minisign
(brew install minisign, apt install minisign). This key signs
the checksum manifest of every Bolt release.
RWR074VTKBGzGWsQbnByhGrH9pQG5uHOJSgqL8rs5Zu4GQAxZ1C+JIzaIf this key ever changes we will say so here and explain why. A key that changes without explanation is a reason to stop and ask us.
Verifying, step by step
These three commands work on the current release right now. Older releases carry SHA256SUMS without a signature, so step 3 works on them and step 2 does not; every release from v0.1.140 onward is signed.
1. Download the checksums and the signature
Both live on the release you downloaded from. SHA256SUMS lists a SHA-256 for every installer and CLI binary in that release; SHA256SUMS.minisig is our signature over that file.
curl -LO https://sparcle.app/releases/latest/SHA256SUMS
curl -LO https://sparcle.app/releases/latest/SHA256SUMS.minisig2. Check the signature against our key
This is the step that proves origin. If it fails, stop. The checksums themselves cannot be trusted, so verifying against them would be meaningless.
minisign -Vm SHA256SUMS -P 'RWR074VTKBGzGWsQbnByhGrH9pQG5uHOJSgqL8rs5Zu4GQAxZ1C+JIza'3. Check your download against the checksums
Only once the signature verifies. Pull your file's line out of the manifest and let shasum check it, substituting the name of the file you actually downloaded. On macOS and Linux it prints the filename followed by OK.
grep ' Bolt-Enterprise-0.1.150-aarch64-apple-darwin.dmg$' SHA256SUMS | shasum -a 256 -cPlatform trust, and where it stands
Both platform signing paths are in place as of 0.1.150. Neither replaces the verification above, which works today and depends on no one else.
macOS Gatekeeper
Developer ID Application: Sparcle Inc. (4VSW7NBZ2S) and carry a
stapled notarization ticket. Check it yourself before installing:
spctl -a -vvv -t install against the downloaded .dmg reports
accepted and source=Notarized Developer ID. Because the ticket
is real, the installer no longer strips the quarantine attribute: it tests for a stapled
ticket and leaves Gatekeeper's own provenance in place.
Windows SmartScreen
In-app updates
Something not verifying?
If a signature or checksum does not match, do not install it. Tell us and we will confirm what the current release should be.