Trust
Cybersecurity, AI security and AI governance, in one map.
For each layer, this page shows the risk, how Bolt and Aeira remove it, and the evidence they leave behind. Worked examples follow, then the parts we do not cover. The statements were checked against the code before publication, and where the desktop and the governed server differ, it says which.
The map
Four layers: the risk, the removal, the evidence.
Read across a row to follow one risk from the problem to the proof.
| Layer | The risk | How Bolt and Aeira remove it | What evidence it produces |
|---|---|---|---|
| Cybersecurity | Anyone with a valid login reaches data and tools beyond their role. Data and policy sit in a vendor's cloud you cannot inspect. Identity is checked once, at sign-in. | Self-hosted on your own infrastructure, including on-prem, private cloud and air-gapped. Sign-in through your identity provider (OIDC, SAML on the web, SCIM provisioning), with sessions ended when your provider deactivates someone. Aeira applies the caller's identity inside the search query. Connectors sign in as the user where the tool supports it. | The sealed audit chain records the security-relevant identity transitions: sign-in, sign-out, delegation and revocation. Audit events forward to Splunk, Microsoft Sentinel or syslog once you configure them. |
| AI security | Customer data, source code and keys are pasted or sent into a model. An agent reads a document it should not, or is steered by hostile content into acting beyond its task. | Detected identifiers and secrets are replaced with tokens before a prompt reaches a model, and restored in the answer. Pastes and typing into supported AI sites are scanned on managed browsers and in the built-in browser. Coding-agent CLIs routed through the relay are masked. Aeira filters by permission before ranking. Agents see only the tools and models their role allows. | A sealed record of each masking decision (counts and categories, never the matched values) and of each tool call (name, outcome, never the arguments). Decisions made by the browser guard are recorded once an administrator turns on Data Protection auditing. |
| AI governance | Nobody can say what an agent did, for whom, or who approved it. A deletion request cannot be shown to have been carried out. Policy exists on paper, not in the data path. | Built-in policy packs (22 jurisdiction packs and 7 universal, sector and extension packs) that you switch on mask identifiers and can block model use in the data path. Risky or sensitive agent steps wait for a person. Per-person deletion in Bolt and per-tenant crypto-shred in Aeira each produce a receipt. | A tamper-evident, Ed25519-signed Merkle audit chain that your auditor checks with a standalone verifier and your own public key, with no Sparcle secret involved. Deletion receipts, signed with the deployment's key, that name what was not erased. |
| Endpoint | An AI app on a laptop that nobody can characterize: what it binds, what it spawns, what it sends home. Shadow AI use that a security team cannot see. | Bolt installs as an ordinary signed app. It makes no analytics or licence calls. It makes two automatic connections: the update check, which policy can turn off, and news headlines from public feeds, which can be turned off in settings. Neither carries your content. Device policy arrives through your MDM profile on macOS, Group Policy on Windows and managed storage in the browser extension. | A self-disclosed inventory of ports, spawned commands, permissions and network behaviour, in the form a SOC console labels. On the governed server, masking decisions are sealed in the audit chain, and browser-guard decisions once Data Protection auditing is on. |
Agents
Three questions every agent review asks.
Who is the agent, who is it acting for, and what may it do right now. Here is what holds today, and what does not.
| Question | What holds today | Where it stops |
|---|---|---|
| Who is the agent? | Agent activity is attributed in the sealed chain: each tool call and each delegation records who acted, which tool and the outcome. | Agents act under the signed-in user. A delegated child session can be scoped and revoked. A separately named service identity per agent is not something we claim. |
| Who is it acting for? | Connectors that support per-user sign-in use the person's own permissions. Aeira receives the verified user identity on every query. | Some tools use an organization-held key and do not inherit per-user permissions. Tools differ, so check the connector. |
| What may it do right now? | Each agent can have its own tool allowlist. Which models, agents, tools and skills a person can reach is set by role, group or department. Consequential steps wait for a person, and the decision is sealed. | Command rules for coding agents are per device, not per user. The owner can stop a run and a delegated session can be revoked. We found no administrator control that stops another person's run. |
Worked examples
Six situations, from the risk to the proof.
Each example names the risk, what Bolt or Aeira does, the cost it removes, the evidence it leaves and its limit. None of them is a statistic, and none quotes a saving, because we have not measured one.
A coding agent is about to send an API key to a model vendor
An auditor asks what an agent did
A person asks to be deleted, and a tenant leaves
A search assistant is asked for a document the asker may not read
An everyday question is answered on the device
Where it fits
What Bolt and Aeira do, and what they do not.
Bolt enables safe AI and non-AI work on the endpoint, enforces policy where it sits in the path, and collects the evidence. It works with the tools you already run and does not replace them. For each layer: what it does, what it works alongside, and where it stops.
Cybersecurity
AI security
AI governance
Endpoint
Endpoint
What the desktop app does on a machine.
Security teams judge an endpoint by behaviour. This is the short version, and the full inventory is linked.
Desktop and server
Where the desktop app and the governed server differ.
Strict enforcement needs an operator to hold the policy. A single user on a laptop is warned and informed, and a managed organization is blocked.
| Topic | Desktop app | Governed server and managed devices |
|---|---|---|
| An image that cannot be read for masking | Forwarded with a visible Not masked notice and an audit record | Blocked when the organization requires the relay |
| Pastes into AI sites | Warn, unless a managed operator sets a stricter policy | Redact or block under managed policy |
| Audit chain | Needs a key service and database; off without them | Sealed and signed; a Regulated setting refuses to start without it |
| Sign-in | OIDC; SAML opens on the web | OIDC, SAML on the web, SCIM |
| Roles over models, agents and tools | Single user, so not applicable | Per role, group or department |
| Network | Update check, news headlines from public feeds, optional feedback | No Sparcle domain |
Not covered
What we do not claim.
A map that hides its edges is not a map. These are the things people ask about that we do not do today.
Go deeper
Agent safety covers hostile content and its limits. Verify it yourself shows how to check the audit chain. Cryptographic erasure explains the shred and its limits. What Bolt does on your endpoint lists the local behaviour. Agent Gateway explains masking for coding agents. Where the model runs covers the three deployment modes.
Reviewing Bolt or Aeira?
Tell us which layer your review starts with and we will walk the evidence for it.